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China s Population Policy 
in Historical Context
TYRENE WHITE
For nearly forty years, China’s birth limitation program has been the defin­itive example of state intrusion into the realm of reproduction. Although 
the notorious one-child policy did not begin officially until 1979, the state’s 
claims to a legitimate role in the regulation of childbearing originated in 
the 1950S and the enforcement of birth limits in the early 1970s. What was 
new about the one-child policy was not the state’s claim of authority over 
the realm of human reproduction; that claim had been staked long before. 
What was new was the one-child-per-family birth Hmit, and the strength­
ened commitment of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaders to enforce 
this limit.
The formal retirement of the one-child birth limit in 2014—the result of a 
long-debated decision to allow aU childbearing-age couples to have a second 
child if either the mother or father were only children, wiU no doubt invite 
many retrospective assessments of its impact on China’s development process, 
on women and families, and on Chinese society. Some will emphasize the 
hubris of the Chinese government, its audacity in supposing it had the right 
to impose strict birth Hmits and make aU adults ask and receive official state 
permission to conceive and give birth. Others will look at it from an entirely 
different perspective, one that emphasizes the contribution of China to what 
they perceive as the problem of global overpopulation. Still others wiU use 
economic analysis to determine how much of China’s post-1979 economic 
growth can be attributed to the reduced rates of population growth and fer- 
tihty that resulted from the policy. A fourth category might emphasize the 
gendered dynamics of the Chinese program.’
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Each of these perspectives has its virtues, but one Hmitation will be the 
tendency to see the one-child poUcy as a starting point—as the beginning 
of China’s great social experiment of the late twentieth century, rather than 
the culmination of a political and poUcy process that had been unfolding 
in China since 1949, and a global process of social change as the ideas and 
instruments of population control evolved and spread during the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries. To understand the meaning and significance of the 
one-child poUcy, however, it must be examined against the backdrop of these 
global and domestic forces. Domestically, Marxist theory and Soviet practice 
combined with China’s post-1949 revolutionary poHtics and Maoist doc­
trine to produce a unique language for population policy and carve out a set 
of institutions and practices that laid the foundation for strict state regulation 
of childbirth. Globally, the debate over the relationship between population 
and development, which could be traced to its Malthusian origins, had been 
mixed with the ideas of social Darwinism and the institutions of colonial rule 
to produce growing anxiety over the rapid growth of the nonwhite popula­
tion and the potential threat it posed to the established hierarchy of power 
relations and to the quality of the human species.^
These dynamics provided the social and poHtical matrix within which 
China’s population policy evolved, and at the broadest level, explain how 
China came to embrace the one-child poHcy. In similar fashion, it was the 
evolution of these same domestic and global forces that led to its decHne and 
retirement.
Before turning to a brief history of the evolution of China’s popula­
tion poHcy, a note about the meaning of the so-caUed one-child poHcy. It is 
important to keep in mind that “one-child policy” is a useful and descrip­
tive label for the birth Hmitation program that China adopted in 1979, but it 
does not capture the complexity or variability of the policy as implemented 
over time and space and ethnic group. Although all of China’s childbearing- 
age population was urged to have only one child, China’s minority groups 
(approximately 10 percent of the population) were never required to Umit 
births to one child, nor were many farm households who inhabited rela­
tively poor and sparsely populated regions of the country. Parents of children 
born with serious physical or mental limitations were also permitted to have 
another child. And beginning in 1984, five years after the poUcy’s inception, 
rural resistance and widespread reports of female infanticide, combined with 
central-level conflict over the direction of reform, led the regime to relax 
the pohcy for rural residents whose first child was a girl. Under this revised
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policy, labeled a “one-son or two-child policy,” rural couples whose first 
child was female were given official permission to have a second child after 
a waiting period of three to five years.There were also periods when Beijing 
ceded to local authorities more room to adapt poHcy to local conditions, as 
long as they did not exceed their birth and population growth targets for the 
year. At other times, however, they exercised more centrahzed control. In 
addition, regulations permitted couples comprised of two only children to 
have a second child. As large numbers of the one-child generation entered 
their marriage and childbearing-age years after 2000, therefore, the numbers 
eUgible to have a second child grew rapidly. In short, the “one-child policy” 
is a label that accurately describes the poHcy goal, and generally describes the 
pohcy in effect for most urban households through 2013, but it obscures the 
reahty of a much more complex pattern of regulation and enforcement that 
varied over time and space.
Additionally, undue focus on the one-child policy years obscures the 
significance of what came before 1979. Yet without the steps taken dur­
ing this earlier period, state capacity to Hmit couples to one child would 
have been lacking. With that in mind, I will look closely at developments 
prior to 1979 that help illuminate the connections between China and the 
wider world.
Chinese Politics and Population Policy:
An Overview
The history of China’s population poUcy between 1949 and 1979 echoes 
the overall history of the People’s Repubhc over that same period. After the 
defeat of Japan in 1945, the CCP fought a civil war against the US-backed 
Nationalist Party. After the Communist victory in 1949, the CCP took sev­
eral years to consoUdate its authority and begin the transition to sociaHst 
government (i949-52).This was followed by the First Five-Year Plan period 
from 1953 to 1957, which saw the collectivization of agriculture and the 
sociaUst transformation of the industrial economy. Divisions within the lead­
ership over such issues as the pace of collectivization, the role of material 
incentives, and the virtues of mass mobihzation over bureaucratic governance 
were temporarily but forcefully reined in by Mao Zedong, who launched the 
Great Leap Forward in 1958. This frenzied campaign was grounded in the 
Maoist behef in voluntarism, or the capacity of human action, if properly led
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and motivated, to override the limits of the material conditions through mas­
sive and sustained human effort.^ In the case of the Great Leap Forward, the 
goal was to overtake the Soviet Union in level of development through one 
great burst of mobiUzation. Rather than achieve that goal, by 1961 the cam­
paign had resulted in around fifty milhon excess deaths due to starvation and 
related factors, the near-coUapse of collective agriculmre, and overall eco­
nomic stagnation/While other poHtical leaders (including Deng Xiaoping) 
worked to restore order and revive the economy from 1962 to 1965, Mao 
retreated to focus his attention on the international sociaHst movement.What 
he saw happening in the USSR discouraged him, and led him to believe that 
it was possible for the revolution to be undermined by “revisionists” who 
courted the capitaHst West and preferred negotiation to revolutionary war­
fare. Concluding that the Bolshevik Party in Moscow had been corrupted in 
this way, he began to build momentum for a great purge of the CCP. Rather 
than foUow the standard practice of rectifying the party through an inter­
nal process controlled by the party this purge was to be conducted by the 
masses, who were encouraged to root out capitaHst-roaders within the party 
and purge society of all aspects of traditional or bourgeois culture. As Red 
Guards began to foUow Mao’s call in 1966, the Great Proletarian Cultural 
Revolution began, and government, poUce, and security operations came to 
a halt. Red Guards meted out harsh justice to anyone beHeved to have devi­
ated from the Maoist path, and not content with those batdes, they began to 
fight among themselves over who should be considered the true followers of 
Chairman Mao. When the political devastation and social disruption grew 
too severe, Mao chose to rein in the Red Guards, but the poUtical and policy 
changes that began during this period (1966—69) continued through 1976.^ 
Despite the continuation of radical Maoist policies. Premier Zhou Enlai 
led a revival of the normal operations of state governance, and the first 
order of business was to draft a Fourth Five-Year Plan (1971-75). In 1975, 
this was followed by a call for “modernization by the year 2000,” an ambi­
tious goal that was intended to prevent China from falling farther behind 
its rapidly developing neighbors. Before any significant momentum could 
be built toward that goal, however, both Mao and Zhou died in 1976. The 
leadership struggle that followed was not resolved until 1978, when Deng 
Xiaoping and his aUies relaunched the campaign for “modernization by the 
year 2000” and took the first steps toward reform. This new path of reform 
allowed China to meet and exceed the development goals it had set for the 
year 2000.®
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It was against this backdrop of political volatility that China’s approach to 
population poUcy evolved, and like many other poUcies, it became a pawn 
in leadership struggles and was subject to changing political winds. During 
the first two decades of the Maoist era, however, the proper approach to 
demographic issues was hotly debated and contested. Initially, the CCP and 
its leader, Mao Zedong, resisted any suggestion that a large population con­
stituted a problem. They rejected the claim that China was overpopulated, 
arguing instead that the appearance of overpopulation was actually the result 
of the exploitative system of capitalism, and would disappear as capitaUsm 
was replaced by socialism.
It did not take long, however, for top officials in the CCP to begin to worry 
quietly about the pressures created by a large and rapidly growing popula­
tion. When the results of China’s first national census were tallied in 1954, 
the leadership began to understand the dimensions of the problems China 
faced, and some began to worry that the CCP could never meet its promises 
to the peasantry to end the hunger and want that had characterized their lives 
before the revolution. Some began to speak in more practical ways about 
the burden of population growth, and to recommend that China amend its 
population poUcy to provide more support for family-planning education 
and allow the import of condoms and other contraceptive suppHes.’
Before these first steps could yield any meaningful results, however, the 
radicahzation of domestic poHtics interrupted the effort, and advocates of 
family planning were branded as “rightists,” or enemies of the revolution. At 
the same time, however, the middle and late 1950s was a period of intensified 
state planning. All institutions and bureaucracies were mobilized to put into 
place annual five-year performance plans that would help China achieve its 
goal of becoming an advanced socialist economy and society. In this context, 
it was Mao who suggested in 1957 that China should attempt to plan repro­
duction in the same way it aspired to plan material production.The focus on 
planning made it more difficult for critics to undermine birth control efforts, 
since it was the logic of sociaHst planning, and not Malthusian pessimism, 
that prompted it. Planning could be associated with either pronataHsm or 
antinatahsm.
At the time, birth planning (jihua shengyu), that is, the attempt to regulate 
population growth so as to keep it in balance vwth levels of economic pro­
duction and growth, was only a goal to be reached at some more advanced 
stage of sociaHst development. As China’s population continued to grow rap­
idly in the 1960s, however, key leaders such as Premier Zhou Enlai came to
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believe that birth planning could no longer be postponed. In 1965, Zhou 
proposed the first national population control target—reducing the annual 
rate of population growth to i percent by the end of the century, and by 
1972 he had authorized the creation of an extensive family-planning bureau­
cracy to oversee implementation of population poUcy, provide free access to 
contraceptives, abortions, and steriHzations, and monitor the enforcement 
of local birth targets. SociaHst planning thus came to embrace human repro­
duction in much the same way that it embraced agricultural and industrial 
production. Local officials who were responsible for meeting grain and steel 
production quotas now began to receive quotas for babies.*
In the early and mid-1970s, the poHcy focus was “later, longer, fewer,” 
that is, promoting later marriage, longer spacing between births (three to 
five years), and fewer births (a two-child ideal and a three-child limit). By 
mid-decade, the childbearing norm began to tighten; the new slogan was 
“One is not too few, two is enough, three is too many.” In the cities, young 
couples began to feel pressure to have only one child. In the countryside, 
they were urged to have no more than two. In 1979, a group of China’s 
top scientists announced that if China was to achieve its economic goals 
by the year 2000—a goal that the new Deng regime had expressed as 
achieving a per capita gross national product of $1,000 by the year 2000 
(subsequently reduced to $800 per capita),population had to be contained 
within 1.2 billion. In turn, this meant that the official birth limit had to 
be lowered to one child per couple (with some exceptions for special 
circumstances). The scientists, whose computer models and calculations 
were based on faulty and inadequate data, succeeded in persuading Deng 
Xiaoping of the absolute necessity of the one-child policy, and it soon 
became official policy.®
In an extraordinary “Open Letter” to CCP members that was pub­
lished in all newspapers in September 1980, China’s leaders defended the 
new policy and made it clear to the CCP membership the high level of 
priority they attached to it. They argued that the two-decade delay after 
1949 was a fateful mistake. By the time the state began to encourage fer­
tility control, a huge new generation of young people had already been 
born who were approaching their childbearing years. As a result, even 
with declining fertility levels (i.e., the average number of children born 
to a woman during her reproductive years), demographic momentum 
meant continued growth of total population size.That growth threatened 
to reach 1.5 billion by century’s end if no action was taken, the letter
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argued, a number that would doom China to poverty and backward­
ness through another generation if urgent action was not taken by this 
generation.
Implementing the One-Child Policy
The one-child poUcy was inaugurated just as the Deng regime was about 
to embark on a far-reaching reform program that gradually transformed 
China’s economy, poUty, and society. The collective economy was gradually 
decollectivized and marketized; poHtics was deradicalized and poHtical insti­
tutions revived; society was granted relief from the aU-intrusive party-state 
that had permeated every aspect of pubUc and private life. Change came in 
fits and stops, with periods of dramatic change often followed by a partial 
retreat to safer political ground.This pattern gave Chinese politics a cyclic or 
wave pattern, not unlike the high tides and low tides of the mass campaigns of 
the Mao era.Through all of these changes and fluctuations in pofitical atmo­
sphere, the insistence on strict birth control never faltered. It was a constant 
in an otherwise volatile situation.
In the early years of the program (1979-83), as the Deng regime fought 
against the lingering influences of the Cultural Revolution, it was possible to 
use the tools and institutions of the Maoist era to press for strict enforcement 
of birth quotas that were handed down to each city, county, neighborhood, 
and village. Thirty years of Maoism had taught Chinese citizens to be wary 
of voicing opposition to the latest campaign, taught officials that they could 
intimidate and coerce anyone who dared to defy them, and taught party 
leaders at all levels that the failure to meet campaign quotas was one of the 
seven deadly sins of Chinese poHtics. A poor campaign performance could 
spell the end of a promising career.
The tasks local officials faced were formidable. AH childbearing-age 
couples, urban and rural, had to receive official birth permits from the state 
in order to give birth legaUy. In addition, provinces and local governments 
drafted regulations offering economic incentives to encourage policy com- 
pHance and imposing stiff sanctions on poHcy violators. AH childbearing-age 
women were required to undergo periodic gynecological exams to ensure 
they were not carrying an “unplanned” pregnancy, and if they were, they 
were pressed to undergo an abortion immediately.The new regulations often 
came with a three-month window before enforcement began; women who
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were already pregnant, but did not have an official birth permit, were thus 
duly warned, and faced the difficult choice between abortion or family ruin. “ 
In China s cities and towns, the total fertility rate had dechned from 3.3 in 
1970 to about 1.5 by 1978, a remarkably low level for a developing country. 
Determined to push it even lower, however, state monitoring intensified in 
workplaces and neighborhoods. Monthly or quarterly gynecological exami­
nations for chUdbearing-age women, plus a system of marriage and birth 
permits provided by the collective work unit or the neighborhood commit­
tee, made it hard for anyone to escape the tight surveillance net. Those who 
did faced severe penalties if caught, including fines and loss of employment, 
perhaps even one’s coveted urban household registration.'^
Rural China posed a far greater challenge. Agricultural work requires 
household labor, and even very young children can be put to work in ser­
vice of the family income. Moreover, children were the only guarantee 
of old-age support, and the most destitute villagers were inevitably those 
who were alone and childless. Only a son could assure a couple that they 
would be spared such a fate. Daughters usually married out of the village, 
and upon marriage a daughter’s first obHgation transferred to her husband’s 
family. In addition to these practical considerations, the traditional emphasis 
on bearing sons to carry on the ancestral line remained deeply entrenched 
in the countryside. As a result, although rural fertihty levels were cut in half 
between 1971 and 1979 (declining from approximately 6.0 to 3.0), much of 
rural China remained hostile to a two- or one-child hmit, including the vil­
lage officials who would have to enforce the policy. When the rural reforms 
implemented after 1978 began to relax the state’s administrative grip on the 
peasantry just as the one-child pohcy was launched, therefore, it set the stage 
for an intense struggle over the control of childbearing.
The struggle took a variety of forms. In some villages, women who refused 
to abort an unplanned birth were subjected to endless meetings where they 
were berated, intimidated, and threatened into cooperation. In others, medi­
cal teams and party cadres swooped in unexpectedly, in an effort to catch 
women who were eluding them. At worst, women were forced onto trucks 
and taken directly to the township headquarters, where medical personnel 
would perform abortions and sterilizations and insert intrauterine devices. 
The use of some form of birth control after the first or second child became 
mandatory, and in the countryside the preferred method was the lUD, since 
it was always in place and not easily removed.The insertion of an lUD imme­
diately after childbirth became standard practice.
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Villagers resisted in a variety of ways, including leaving the village until the 
campaign was over and the baby was born, using bribery to get a birth per­
mit, attacking or killing family-planning officials, resorting to female infan­
ticide, or, more common after the mid-1980s, sex-selective abortion. Absent 
the one-child poUcy, it was common in the countryside to consider the birth 
of a daughter a “small happiness” and a son a “big happiness.” When this pat­
tern of son preference was reinforced by a one-child birth Umit, some were 
driven to use any means possible to guarantee they would have a son.''^
Rather than retreat in the face of resistance, the state intensified its efforts. 
In late 1982, a massive sterUization campaign was launched, with the goal of 
eUminating all third and higher births. The result of this massive campaign 
was a fourfold increase in the number of tubal Ugations performed in 1983, 
as compared with the previous years, and large increases across every cat­
egory of birth control procedures. So severe were the local pressures to meet 
sterilization targets that many women who had long since completed their 
intended childbearing, and had been effectively utilizing some form of birth 
control, were forced to undergo sterihzation.'^
As the campaign began to play itself out and elite politics took a more 
“hberal” turn, inplementation moved into a second phase (1984-89). A deci­
sion was made to modify the one-cluld policy to allow for more exceptions. 
Fearful of a breakdown of authority in the countryside and widespread anger 
over the one-child limit and the often brutal tactics used to enforce it, leaders 
in Beijing decided to simply concede the need for a son in the countryside. 
Henceforth, the rural pohcy became a one-son or two-child policy.'® Village 
couples whose first child was a daughter would be allowed to have a second 
child, allowed to try again for a son.This concession was made in the hopes of 
pacifying restless villagers, improving enforcement, and reducing the upsurge 
in female infanticide and female infant abandonment, but over a period of 
several years, the net effect of this and other rural reforms was to encourage 
local governments to unduly relax their enforcement efforts.ViUage officials 
who themselves were subject to the birth control poUcies often colluded 
with their neighbors to avoid enforcement efforts undertaken by outside 
teams. As the agricultural reforms destroyed the instruments of control and 
power that officials had enjoyed in the past, they found it difficult to enforce 
birth Hmits, and found it easier to report false numbers than fight with neigh­
bors and kin.”
The net effect of this poHcy “slippage” was to weaken central control over 
the levers of enforcement, and provide support for experts and birth-planning
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officials who argued that the policy should be more flexible across differ­
ent regions of China, allowing those in the most impoverished areas with 
difficult, hilly terrain to have two children, allowing those in average cir­
cumstances to have one son or two children, and Umiting those in more 
prosperous areas to only one child. They believed that the same results could 
be achieved, with less effort and more willing compUance, than if the poUcy 
did not respond to the nuances of family need and economic circumstance.
This more differentiated pohcy was put into place in the latter half of 
the 1980s, only to be upset by the events of May—June 1989, which ended 
in a miUtary crackdown on Tiananmen protesters and their supporters in 
Beijing and around the country. The martial atmosphere that returned to 
Chinese politics for the next two to three years made it possible to once again 
tighten local enforcement, ushering in a third phase of poUcy enforcement 
(1989-95). As in 1982-83,fears about a poor performance justified the revival 
of campaign methods. Cadres who had been warned off those methods in the 
mid-1980s were now instructed to use “crack troops” and “shock attacks” to 
break through resistance and meet the new goals of the I99i~95 pl^ri period. 
They were also chastised over the failure to meet the goals of the five-year 
plan ending in 1990. China s population control targets for that year had been 
exceeded by a very substantial margin, giving fuel to those who believed that 
it was acceptable to use coercion in service of the higher goal of achieving 
the per capita economic goals that had been set for the year 2000. It was also 
justified by the preliminary results of the 1990 census, which indicated that 
China’s population had grown more quickly than planned or expected.”* 
These numbers prompted the conservative leadership to tighten enforce­
ment, returning to a strict formula that Umited all urban couples to only 
one child, and aU rural couples to one son or two children. Exceptions were 
granted only to some of China’s smaller minority nationahties, and to parents 
whose first child was mentally or physically handicapped to such a degree 
that they were unable to function as a healthy, working adult. Local officials 
were put on notice that they were Hable for strict enforcement, and that 
failure to achieve their performance targets for birth planning would result 
in economic penalties, administrative sanctions, and even demotions. They 
were to assume that meeting population targets was just as important to their 
future career success as meeting key economic goals.'®
This success came at a price, however. Evidence of intimidation and coer­
cion was widespread, particularly in areas that had done poorly prior to 1990. 
Rural cadres who sided with their fellow villagers did what was necessary
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to give the appearance of compliance, but also behaved as they had in the 
past when the work was hard and the campaign targets too ambitious—^by 
lying, exaggerating, or finding other ways to manipulate the system. Because 
of these practices and others, many Chinese demographers expressed great 
skepticism when survey data suggested in 1995 that China’s fertihty level had 
dropped to 1.4.“
The reversion to a more radical political atmosphere began to fade after sev­
eral years, ushering in yet another phase of policy evolution and implementa­
tion (1995-2013). Responding to the new challenges, the post-Tiananmen 
politics of conservatism gave way to a new wave of reform and opening that 
rapidly transformed the political, economic, and social landscape.
It was in this context that many of China’s population specialists began 
again to challenge the wisdom of the administrative and punitive approach 
to population control that had been reUed on since the 1970s. Leading figures 
in China’s new generation of highly trained demographers and sociologists 
criticized the assumption that “fewer births is everything,” arguing that it 
led to “short-sighted actions (such as surprise raids on big-bellied women).” 
Frankly acknowledging that China’s fertihty decHne had been induced 
through the widespread use of coercion, the authors insisted on the need for 
a broader and more complex view of population dynamics and a popula­
tion pohcy better suited to an overall strategy of “sustainable development.” 
Writing that “the curtain is gradually closing on the era of monolithic popu­
lation control,” the authors went on to discuss the disturbing consequences of 
that approach (including sex ratio imbalances and a rapidly aging population) 
and the necessity of shifting to a developmental approach that emphasized 
improvements and investments in the quaUty of the population.^' In short, 
they argued that development was the best route to fertility decline, rejecting 
in the process the sort of “population determinism” (fewer births is every­
thing) that was so deeply embedded in China’s population control strategy.
Domestically, the problem of rural unrest and instability was again preoc­
cupying the leadership, and buttressed the position of advocates of reform. 
One of the major complaints of villagers was the use of coercive birth control 
tactics to collect taxes and fees owed to the local government. Not only did 
new documents on rural taxation expHcidy forbid the use of those mea­
sures, a family-planning document issued in 1995 codified them as seven 
types of prohibited behaviors: (i) illegally detaining, beating, or humiliating 
an offender or a relative; (2) destroying property, crops, or houses; (3) rais­
ing mortgages without legal authorization; (4) imposing “unreasonable”
340 REPRODUCTIVE STATES
fines or confiscating goods; (5) implicating relatives or neighbors of offend­
ers, or retahating against those who report cadre misbehavior; (6) prohibiting 
childbirths permitted by the local plan in order to fulfill population targets; 
(7) organizing pregnancy checkups for unmarried women.This itemiza­
tion of unacceptable behaviors underscored the extent to which the increas­
ingly professional family-planning bureaucracy sought to distance itself from 
the coercive methods of enforcement that had remained prevalent in the 
countryside.
Meanwhile, changes in the international discourse on population and 
development also encouraged advocates of poHcy reform. When China 
began to implement its one-child policy in 1979, the discourse on popula­
tion issues was still dominated by a “population control” paradigm that saw 
population growth as an impediment to national advancement and a threat 
to global survival. By the mid-1990s, another school of thought had emerged 
and displaced the old paradigm.This alternative approach focused on wom­
en’s reproductive health and rights, and emphasized the organic relationship 
between the elevation of the status of women (especially through increased 
education and employment outside the home), the elimination of poverty, 
and declining fertility levels.
Convinced that change was already overdue, many demographers and 
family-planning officials embraced this new discourse, and called for 
the reform of China’s poHcy. Change came slowly, however, despite the 
unsavory consequences of the policy, including a distorted sex ratio and a 
rapidly aging population. After some internal debate, the Chinese govern­
ment officially reavowed its one-child policy in 2000 and in 2001 passed 
a long-debated Population and Family Planning Law that upheld the 
existing policy and gave compliance the force of law.Although the law 
included provisions that called for an “informed choice of safe, effective, 
and appropriate contraceptive methods,” and one prohibiting officials from 
infringing on “personal rights, property rights, or other legitimate rights 
and interests,” it reaffirmed China’s basic approach to population control. 
Subsequently, however, as the one-child generation matured and married 
in growing numbers, the state reiterated the right of two single children to 
have a second child if desired.
Despite the political reluctance to abandon the one-cluld poHcy, poUcy 
developments in other areas began to shift the focus away from raw popu­
lation numbers. The decade was dominated by growing concerns over the 
lack of a social insurance system and retirement support for an aging society.
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rapidly rising healthcare costs associated with both aging and environmen­
tal degradation, and sustainabiUty and climate change. Taken together, these 
issues formed a development trifecta that revealed the need for a more flex­
ible and supple population poUcy. As a result, pressures for reform grew. By 
2012, those pressures led to the pubhcation of a pro-reform report by the 
China Development Research Foundation, a top-tier think tank that is sup­
ported by, and advises, the State Council on poHcy issues.The report, which 
urged that the one-child policy be phased out by 2015, paved the way for 
decisions announced subsequently during the Eighteenth Party Congress 
and National People’s Congress in 2013.
China’s Population Control Program 
in Global Perspective
In 1989, when the Deng regime crushed the prodemocracy movement, 
China still inhabited a world defined by the contours of the Cold War. By 
1992, that world had disappeared, and the CCP now faced the problem of 
how to survive in a post-Leninist, postsociahst world. The answer, in part, 
was to hft the conservative strictures that had been imposed after June 4,1989, 
and return to the path of economic reform. As was the case in 1979, however, 
strictures on childbearing remained firmly in place. Justifications of the one- 
child policy in 1980 were based on the argument that sociafist moderniza­
tion could not be achieved without it, and the CCP was obUged to take all 
steps necessary to achieve that goal. By 1995, with the end of the Cold War 
and collapse of the Soviet Union, the language of socialism was more muted. 
Modernization was everything, and even as China’s economy steamed 
toward levels of economic development that had only been dreamed of in 
1979, the leadership refused to revisit the one-child pohcy in any serious way. 
Annual reports and speeches attributed China’s great economic success to 
correct economic poUcies and directives. Population control, which in 1980 
was argued to be the crucial factor on which all development goals rested, 
was given Uttle credit by the late 1990s. And yet the “numbers are every­
thing” approach, long abandoned in other parts of the economy, remained 
the rigid foundation on which China’s population pohcy was premised.
China’s move in 1979 to Hmit childbearing-age couples to only one 
child was a unique and unprecedented state intervention into the realm 
of reproduction, a confirmation, if you will, of Michel Foucault’s vision of
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all-encompassing state hegemony.^* Taking that step took audacity, author­
ity, institutional capacity, and a degree of leadership commitment that is rare 
in any regime. If there were distinctive quahties of the Chinese context that 
made the conception and enforcement of a one-child policy possible, how­
ever, there were also other ways in which Chinese experience ran parallel to 
that of many other developing world countries, especially in Asia. For all of 
its unique elements, the Chinese case was also part of a broader global history 
and was significantly influenced by it.
Turning first to the distinctive aspects of the Chinese experience, China 
succeeded in intensifying its population control policy and reducing the birth 
hmit to one child by relying on a number of unique ideas and institutions, 
and by wedding population control to the regime’s highest priority of all— 
rapid modernization.The idea of jihm shengyu or “birth planning,’’ a concept 
central to the Chinese program, allowed advocates of birth control to elide 
the internal struggle between leftist and rightist forces, a development that 
helped to insulate the government’s increasingly bold antinataHst stance from 
the radical poHtics and policies of the Cultural Revolution decade (1966- 
76). This development was crucial, allowing advocates of birth control and 
regulated childbirth to block charges from the left of neo-Malthusianism, 
and charges from cultural conservatives within the party who objected to 
the expansion of family-planning education and access on moral grounds. 
In the early attempts to advocate family planning, supporters had used the 
hberal language of the West, translating “family planning’’ literally as jiating 
jihua, population control as renkou jiezhi, and birth control as shengyu jiezhi. 
The shift to jihua shengyu, or birth planning, was purposeful, placing the entire 
project within the poUticaUy unassailable context of socialist economic plan­
ning. From the time of the second birth control campaign in the mid-1960s, 
therefore, birth planning defined China’s poUcy, and jiating shengyu (family 
planning) was used only to distinguish China’s approach from the liberal, 
bourgeois model of the West.
In addition to this unique language, China benefited from unique institu­
tions. The CCP was the key institution, since it penetrated all levels and all 
organizations of Chinese society. Its pervasive presence in every town and 
village, and the regime’s insistence after the revolution that there be no inde­
pendent sources of influence or authority, meant that leaders in Beijing had a 
rehable instrument of enforcement. Whatever the limitations and weaknesses 
in Beijing’s ability to compel a disciplined response from party officials down 
the line—and there were many—those limitations paled in comparison
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with the challenges faced by other developing world regimes. Although the 
reform era made it increasingly difficult to maintain that discipUne, Beijing 
adapted as necessary. In the early 1990s, for example, lax enforcement of birth 
limits led Beijing to introduce the “one-ballot veto system” for assessing the 
work of local officials. This system was intended to make birth control tar­
gets as important as economic targets by making their achievement critical 
to annual assessments of cadre performance. Under this system, fulfilling or 
even exceeding all economic targets was insufficient to gain a positive assess­
ment and receive bonuses and other perks. Cadres also had to meet their 
birth control goals. If not, this one failure would taint their evaluation, and 
perhaps their career.
A second unique institution that Beijing could draw on was the mobi­
lization campaign, which embodied a Maoist approach to policy imple­
mentation. Mass mobilization campaigns were an endemic part of the 
political and policy process in China, and were used extensively to gal­
vanize the party to swift action, mobilize the masses to participate in 
the campaign, and push toward the fulfillment of the campaign’s goals. 
During the Maoist era, these campaigns followed a predictable pattern. 
First came the caU to mobilize, then came the campaign to carry out the 
program, which led to frenzied efforts on the part of local authorities that 
often provoked a backlash and resistance from the targets of the campaign. 
This reaction to the overreach by local enforcers led to a moderation of 
the program, which sometimes was followed by a second hard push for 
enforcement. Party officials at all levels were highly motivated to meet the 
targets or goals they had been assigned, since failure to do so could result 
in a major career setback or, even worse, a political attack on officials’ revo­
lutionary commitment.^*
Frequent repetitions of this pattern during the Maoist era had the effect of 
turning it into China’s primary institution for policy implementation, and it 
was this instrument that the new Deng regime turned to when it launched 
the one-chQd policy. And here we stumble upon a great historical irony. At 
the very moment when the Deng regime was setting out to undo much of the 
Maoist legacy, Hberate Chinese politics and society from the disruptive con­
sequences of repeated poUtical campaigns, and routinize Chinese governance, 
the new leaders put their full weight behind a massive campaign to implement 
the one-child poHcy and turned a bfind eye to the waves of coercion that 
swept through many parts of China over the next few years as local officials 
were pressed to meet exacting and difficult population targets.
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Although the one-child policy and campaign w'as launched in 1979, it was 
the “Open Letter” to all CCP members, pubhshed in the flagship newspaper 
on September 20, 1980, that stands as the most potent marker of the cam­
paign, and once again sets China apart. Not only did China’s leaders expect 
party members to carry out the campaign, they expected them to abide by 
it. Younger party members were called on to take the lead in signing a cer­
tificate pledging to have only one child, and undergoing sterilization after 
the birth of their first child. Older party members in positions of leadership 
were urged to support their cluldbearing-age children in taking the one- 
child pledge. By making this call public, party leaders brought pressure to 
bear on reluctant local-level officials who shared the view of their neighbors 
that one child was not enough, and that faiHng to produce a son to carry 
on the ancestral Une would bring a worse fate than defying the one-child 
Umit. Ultimately, many did defy that Hmit by using influence, bribes, or falsely 
acquired medical certificates to get around it. Comparatively speaking, how­
ever, what is remarkable is the extent to which the CCP organization was 
able to discipHne its members at all levels.The unprecedented “Open Letter” 
was a clear signal to aU local officials that the one-child poHcy was a top pri­
ority of the PoUtburo, and had to be treated as such.
Another set of institutions assured a high level of compliance among 
the urban population. In the early years of reform, China’s system of col­
lectivized work units remained in place, allowing for close supervision 
of childbearing-age couples. While compliance with the one-child limit 
brought tangible benefits such as free healthcare and priority status for 
school admissions, failure to comply could mean being fired, denied hous­
ing, and denied access to the many other collective benefits that came 
with being part of a work unit. Rather than risk these consequences, most 
acquiesced in the program, which for childbearing-age women meant 
subjection to gynecological exams monthly or quarterly to be sure they 
had not become pregnant without the necessary state-issued birth permit. 
This step was only one of many ways in which women’s bodies became 
the site for policy implementation. The massive 1983—84 sterilization 
campaign, for example, forced many compliant women to abandon the 
birth control method they had been using reliably and undergo steriliza­
tion instead. They were pressured to do so by local officials who had to 
meet their quotas and targets for sterilization procedures within a certain 
period of time, and could not do so without sterilizing women who were 
no risk to the birth limits.^®
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Rural institutions were disrupted by the new reforms more quickly than 
urban ones, placing rural oiFicials in a more precarious position in attempting 
to carry out birth control work. With their monopoly of economic power 
beginning to dissolve and with their own desire to have more than one child, 
rural officials were often caught in a difficult position that only a campaign 
launched from higher levels could alleviate. As a result, poorly performing 
counties or districts were often called upon to launch a localized campaign, 
assisted by medical personnel drafted from county hospitals to speed the rate 
at which birth control procedures—abortions, lUD insertions, sterilizations, 
and vasectomies—could be carried out. Large numbers of personnel would 
descend on a particular locality with the goal of ending aU “unplanned” 
pregnancies (that is, pregnancies that were not authorized by the requisite 
state-issued birth permit) and sterifizing those who had already violated the 
one-child birth Hmit. If resistance was encountered, as it often was, officials 
used whatever means necessary to coerce compliance. Popular methods 
included destroying new homes or other personal property of farmers, hold­
ing one or more of the offender’s parents or grandparents in custody until 
they relented, or subjecting the pregnant women to isolation and harangue 
until they gave in. All of these methods were officially outlawed in the 
mid-1990s, but they were used extensively before that time and continued to 
be used more sporadically over the next twenty years.The campaigns became 
routinized to coincide with Spring Festival (Chinese New Year), when fami- 
Hes gathered, marriages occurred, and spouses Hving in different places were 
reunited, or the summer harvest (August or September), when farmers got a 
respite from their ongoing labor. 3°
It is important to note that the effectiveness of the campaign approach 
was progressively eroded by the success of China’s economic reforms, 
which brought economic development, social change, and a shift to more 
routine forms of bureaucratic governance. These changes led to increased 
reliance on legal and administrative measures and a decline in tolerance 
for the more blunt and coercive tactics associated with campaign-style 
enforcement. This shift did not prevent, however, the episodic recurrence 
of campaigns in scattered localities by local officials determined to make 
quick progress on lowering fertility levels.Those enforcement practices, in 
turn, fomented the popular anger that became more pronounced over time.
If the institutions and practices described above were distinctive to China, 
in other respects the Chinese program, its motives, and its evolution were 
the product of the same global forces that influenced demographic policies
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elsewhere.Whether responding to, or reacting against, international influ­
ences, China’s policy has been shaped far more by external sources than is 
generally acknowledged.
The influence of international forces on the evolution of China’s popu­
lation policy can be seen in several ways. First is the influence of the early 
twentieth-century Euro-American movements supporting birth control 
and eugenics .^^^hile the Chinese revolution unfolded in the early and mid­
twentieth century, anxieties among Western elites about the growth and 
quality of global population—anxieties fueled by Malthusian and social 
Darwinian ideas—helped to galvanize the international family-planning 
movement and shape their views of China. Margaret Sanger, who sat at 
the intersection of the family-planning and eugenics movements, traveled 
to China,Japan, and Korea in 1922 to lecture on the subjects and received 
an enthusiastic reception from local supporters, who began to organize a 
local birth control league.^" Many Chinese feminists and supporters of the 
New Culture Movement supported her call for birth control, and female 
physicians began to open clinics devoted to the needs of women and chil­
dren, including birth control education and services. Due to the politi­
cal turbulence of the 1920s and 1930s, however, these developments were 
limited in their scope and impact, and nationalist elites proffered a range 
of views.
The Chinese Communist Party, by contrast, took a more unified view of 
the matter, dismissing Umited measures such as access to birth control as bour­
geois and calling for sociahst revolution to truly Hberate Chinese women. 
Their official party poHcy in the 1930s and 1940s was pronatalist; high birth 
rates among the peasantry were seen as the only means to compensate for 
losses due to war, disease, and high infant mortahty. At the same time, the 
demand for access to birth control by urban women joining the revolution 
led to an official pohcy advocating delaying marriage until the end of the war 
with Japan. For married couples, birth control was sanctioned as a means to 
delay childbirth.^^
This policy did not go unchallenged, however. Opponents writing 
in the newspaper Liberation Daily (Jiefang ribao) argued that birth control 
surgery was dangerous and bad for women s health. Others opposed birth 
control on moral grounds, arguing that giving birth was a natural human 
phenomenon that should not be artificially regulsted.^'* In the face of this 
opposition, restrictions were placed on access to abortion and sterihzation, 
but birth control after marriage was officially sanctioned.
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At liberation, this birth control policy remained in force, despite the 
adoption of a pronatalist line. With the party leadership absorbed with 
more pressing issues, decision-making on birth control devolved to the 
newly created Ministry of Public Health. Dominated by Western-trained 
medical professionals who were inclined by tradition and training to be 
conservative on the issue of contraception, the ministry drew up regula­
tions that imposed severe restrictions on access to contraception, abortion, 
and sterilization. In April 1950, regulations were issued governing access 
to abortion by female cadres in party, government, and military posts in 
the Beijing District.The regulations were designed to severely limit access, 
and those who met the strict conditions were required to obtain a series 
of written approvals before the procedure could take place.’^ By May 1952, 
national regulations had been drafted; they were approved at the end of the 
year and disseminated on a trial basis.^* The regulations outlawed sterihza- 
tion or abortion except in cases of severe illness or threat to the woman. In 
addition, no woman was eUgible for steriHzation unless she was thirty-five 
years old, had six or more children, and had one child aged ten or above.’^ 
Reinforcing this strict Hne, the Ministry of Health also moved to Hmit 
access to contraceptives. In January 1953, only days after the regulations were 
approved, the ministry notified customs officials that they should stop the 
import of contraceptives.This ban, combined with the restrictive policy 
that discouraged the production of contraceptives domestically, meant that 
even the rudimentary and unreHable contraceptive supphes available at that 
time would continue to be extremely scarce. Supporters of family planning 
thus faced formidable opposition, and that argument unfolded in the mid- 
1950s in the form of the rise and quick fall of China’s first family-planning 
campaign. Access to contraceptives and education on family planning, then, 
were no less contested in revolutionary China than they were in the West, 
and despite the sociaHst doctrine that framed the debate, the issues were pre­
cisely the same.
A second external influence on the CCP’s early position on population 
and family planning was the emerging Cold War. In 1949, the US govern­
ment, seeking to explain the defeat of its aUies, the Nationalists, despite mas­
sive aid and military support, prepared an extensive official history of US 
poHcy in China, explaining why it had ultimately withdrawn support from 
the Nationahsts, why the CCP was winning, but also why the Communist 
regime was bound to fail. The analysis argued that the CCP would not be 
able to meet its obhgation to feed its population because of the unchecked
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population growth. In other words, it argued that the Malthusian dilemma 
would defeat them.^^ Mao Zedong’s response was to condemn this “pessi­
mistic view’’ emanating from the capitalist West as reactionary, Malthusian, 
and “utterly groundless,’’ and to insist instead that China’s large population 
was a great asset.‘^° This rejection of what he saw as Malthusian logic was 
justified by Marxist ideology, which saw “overpopulation” as a byproduct of 
capitalism that would be eliminated by the revolution. It was also consistent 
with the party’s pre-1949 pronatalist pohcy, as well as the Soviet Union’s pro- 
natahst policy after World War II. Nevertheless, this exchange of verbal hos- 
tihties elevated an ongoing and complex internal process of sorting out party 
pohcy on population issues to the status of international insult, creating even 
greater resistance within the CCP to family planning.
A third external factor that influenced China was the successful imple­
mentation of family-planning and birth control programs in its neighbor­
ing countries. In the 1950s and 1960s, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan all 
developed birth control programs, and in the case of Japan, it was also very 
apparent by the mid-1960s that the Japanese economy was recovering rap­
idly from its destruction in World War II. Chinese premier Zhou Enlai was 
especially taken with these developments, particularly given the toll of the 
Great Leap Forward on China’s economy. Between 1963 and 1966, Zhou 
spoke frequently and forcefully on the issue of birth control, arguing that 
it was a “shortcoming” (duanchu) of the socialist system that it did not have 
a “population plan.” Zhou explained this by noting that neither Marx nor 
Lenin had confronted the problem; their writings therefore offered no guid­
ance or solutions. Foreshadowing later developments, he also remarked: “In 
my opinion, after having two children, it is best to undergo sterilization.”'*'
In July 1963, in a speech to high school graduates, Zhou defended the birth 
control pohcy against charges that it was Malthusian. Noting that Malthus 
relied on war and pestilence to solve the population problem, Zhou said.
We can’t rely on war to solve the population problem, and we can’t rely on pes­
tilence, and we certainly can’t rely on overseas developments----[Instead] we
must study advanced experience.'*''
He went on to use the example of Japan as a country whose achievements 
in reducing birth rates deserved China’s attention. He advocated send­
ing experts to Japan to study their methods, or inviting Japanese experts 
to China. Zhou apparently was struck by the fact that Japan’s population 
growth rate had dropped to about 10 per 1,000 by the mid-1960s, so much
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so that in the fall of 1965 he urged in several speeches that China strive to 
achieve the same low growth rate by the end of the century.^ His repeated 
references to the Japanese example are remarkable given the recent history 
ofjapan’s invasion and occupation of China between 1937 ^tid I945> ^tid it is 
indicative of the urgency Zhou felt about China s rapid population growth. 
Unfortunately, the radical poUtics of the Cultural Revolution prevented any 
further action, but as soon as the most radical phase was over, Zhou began to 
restore normal government work, develop a new five-year plan, and press for 
a bigger investment in birth control.
Yet a fourth influence on China was the evolving global discourse on pop­
ulation control.Whereas an international conference held in 1964 was domi­
nated by those who voiced unbridled enthusiasm for population control, 
the 1974 UN conference on population and development, held in Budapest, 
was divided between a pro-population control coaHtion of mostly developed 
world states, and delegations from the global South who took a neo-Marxist 
view that saw population and poverty as a by-product of long-standing 
exploitation by the capitaHst North. To redress this inequity, they called for 
debt forgiveness and economic restructuring to bring about a redistribution 
of wealth.'*^ China, which had long positioned itself in foreign affairs as an 
advocate of nonaUgned Third World regimes, publicly supported this view, 
while continuing to push aggressively at home to lower fertility rates.*^*
When the reform era began a few years later and China’s commitment to 
population control became more transparent, the UN Fund for Population 
Activities, along with many NGOs, academic centers, and scholars, provided 
enthusiastic support to Chinese authorities who were anxious to improve 
their facilities and expertise on demographic issues.They helped train a new 
cohort of Chinese demographers and offered technical assistance as China 
prepared to carry out a population census in 1982. Since that time, China has 
participated in a vast number of international meetings and conferences, col­
laborated with UN organizations and NGOs on research and applied proj­
ects, and become an important source of expertise to countries who wish to 
draw on China’s impressive demographic resources and experience.
The profoundly important role of international actors and ideas on China’s 
program is best illustrated by two examples.The first is the role of Song Jian, 
a prominent scientist, in leading China toward a one-child policy. Attending 
his first international conference in Sweden in 1978) Song became inter­
ested in the scientific modeUng techniques that had been used to develop the 
Club of Rome report called The Limits to Growth in 1972, and Mankind at the
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Turning Point in 1974.'^'’Though his expertise was in cybernetics, and though 
the techniques and the predictions they produced had been widely criticized 
and dismissed in the West, he returned to China and used similar modeHng 
techniques to convince Deng Xiaoping that China s only hope for modern­
ization was with a one-child birth Hmit/^
The second example comes in the 1990s, when internal criticism of 
China’s one-child policy and its consequences began spiUing out into aca­
demic journals and professional conferences. This criticism was provoked in 
part by the new campaign that had gotten underway in the early 1990s to 
crack down on violators of the birth limit, giving rise to a new round of coer­
cion in many areas of the countryside. It was also provoked by the now very 
wide divide that existed between the highly professionaHzed scholars and 
bureaucrats who advised and manned the top ranks of the family-planning 
bureaucracy, and the old guard poHtical leadership that resisted all calls for 
policy reform. In this context, two high-profile international conferences 
gave support and momentum to the reformers.
The first was the 1994 UN Conference on Population and Development 
that was held in Cairo, and the second was the UN Conference on Women 
that was held in Beijing in 1995. For many feminists, the Cairo conference 
was the culmination of a decade or more of work to shift the discourse 
on population and development from one focused on reducing population 
numbers to one focused on reproductive rights and women’s status. Despite 
continued differences among representatives over language pertaining to 
abortion, in particular, the conference report embraced the new language 
and emphasized the organic relationship between the elevation of the status 
of women (especially through increased education and employment outside 
the home), the elimination of poverty, and decUning fertiUty levels."**
The substance of the conference was reported in some detail in the 
Chinese media and in population journals, and shortly thereafter, the influ­
ence of the new international language on Chinese policy became clear. In 
China’s “Outhne Plan for Family Planning Work in 1995-2000,” for example, 
stress was placed on the impact of the sociaHst market economy on popu­
lation control, and on the necessity of Hnking population control to eco­
nomic development. In addition, the plan placed special emphasis on the role 
of education, and urged aggressive efforts to increase women’s educational 
level in order to promote lower fertility. This emphasis dovetailed with the 
Millennial Development Goals adopted by most UN member states in 2000, 
specifying a set of goals to be reached by 2015. China took an active role in
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supporting this agenda, which included a focus on women’s empowerment 
and education, along with gender equaHty/*
A second UN conference, the UN’s Fourth World Conference on 
Women, held in Beijing in 1995, strongly reinforced the Cairo message, 
provoking a new wave of feminist thinking and action, and further encour­
aging SFPC officials to consider a more client-centered approach that gave 
greater consideration to women’s needs and their reproductive health. 
This conference was also important in stimulating the growth of nongov­
ernmental organizations in China, with greater focus on issues related to 
women and gender, and it encouraged established organizations like the 
Women’s Federation to become stronger advocates for women.
Still another way in which global forces influenced the evolution of 
China’s population policy was the revolution in telecommunications that 
made it increasingly difficult to deflect and bury reports that contradicted 
claims that birth Hmits were enforced by routine administrative means, and 
not through the use of coercion. During the 1980s and 1990s, Chinese citi­
zens with complaints against local officials often turned to domestic or for­
eign journalists when their complaints fell on deaf government ears. By the 
later 1990s, however, the arrival of social media platforms, along with a more 
prosperous and tech-sawy population that had easy access to them, made 
containment impossible. In 2012, for example, the family of a woman who 
was forced to abort her seven-month old fetus used social media to publi­
cize her story. Supported by gruesome photographs of the aborted fetus, the 
story drew enormous attention and public outcry, revealing through posted 
comments the depth and breadth of the hatred of the one-child poHcy and 
the hostility toward those who enforce it.*' Repeated episodes of this sort 
were an embarrassment to a regime moving to the forefront of global affairs, 
and the pubUc hostility they revealed tapped into anxieties about regime sta­
bility. Taking incremental steps toward retiring the policy was a way to deal 
with those concerns and dampen popular resentment.*^
Ultimately, of course, the decision to retire the one-child policy was 
an economic and social one. With a rapidly aging population, the policy 
no longer paid the substantial economic dividends that it had in previous 
decades. On the contrary, it was setting China up for economic difficul­
ties in the future. Socially, the pressure to abandon the policy was rising, 
especially as those born under the one-child poHcy were now eligible to 
have two children if both parents were only children. Skewed sex ratios, 
recognized as one of the worst social consequences of the one-child limit.
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remained a major problem, one that would constrain marriage options of 
millions of young men for decades to come. Just as important, corruption 
and wealth had allowed many to buy their way to a second, or even third 
child, by simply paying the required fines. In a social climate where there 
was great resentment of official corruption and economic inequaHty, retain­
ing a policy that was being enforced so unevenly was an increasingly dan­
gerous proposition.
Consequences and Legacy of China’s 
One-Child PoUcy
The one-child pohcy was adopted just as the reform era began in 1979.This 
poses two problems for assessing its impact. First, the consequences of the 
one-child program are deeply intertwined with the consequences and results 
of economic and political reform, so much so that it can be difficult to distin­
guish the effects of birth planning from other effects of reform. And where 
those effects are clearly entangled, it is even harder to weigh the relative influ­
ence of one versus the other. Second, looking at the consequences of the 
one-child policy from today’s vantage point, it is easy to forget that the con­
sequences have been unfolding and evolving since 1979.They are not static 
or categorical. This fluidity means that there can be no definitive assessment 
that takes into account the unfolding story of the policy and China’s socio­
economic transformation.
Despite these two important caveats, it is stfll clear that the implementa­
tion of China’s one-child poHcy has had an enormous impact on Chinese 
society, though not always the impact that has been claimed by the state. On 
the one hand, there can be no doubt that the size and composition of China’s 
population at the beginning of the reform era—young, educated, and under­
employed—aided in China’s rapid economic development, or that maintain­
ing lower levels of fertility freed up more resources than would otherwise 
have been available to invest in human capital. Eager to justify two decades of 
state control, however, at the end of the century Chinese authorities declared 
that China’s population pohcy had prevented four hundred million births 
since 1970. At the time, this assertion went unchallenged in public forums, 
with the result that it became a widely known figure and was republished as 
fact in many media reports. In fact, the calculations that led to this estimate 
were as faulty as the ones that led to the adoption of the one-cluld Hmit,
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exaggerating greatly the impact of the one-child policy and China’s overall 
birth-planning program.
That this number was designed to aid state propaganda efforts is made 
clear by the choice of 1970 as the starting point for measurement. In 1970, 
China’s fertility level remained high. The years 1970—79 did see a gradual 
increase in pressures to have fewer children, but the most important devel­
opments of those years were the depohticization of arguments for popula­
tion control, the creation of a family-planning system to provide education 
and support for family planning, and most important, the provision of free 
contraceptives to encourage and hasten adoption of some form of birth 
control. These efforts had a profound effect on China’s urban and rural 
fertility levels, all before the one-child policy got underway. This suggests 
that while state action was crucial in hastening fertility decline, these poUcy 
developments coincided with increased demand for access to contraceptives 
and increased desire of childbearing-age couples to manage their childbear­
ing and limit their number of children. As theorists of fertility decline have 
noted, a population must be “ready, willing, and able’’ to limit childbearing 
before sustained fertility decline can begin. China provided the tools that 
enabled young men and women to act on their fertility preferences, encour­
aged them with propaganda and education, and created political and eco­
nomic incentives to comply.
Choosing the 1970 fertility level as the starting point for calculating the 
impact of China’s population policy, therefore, obscured the impact of the 
one-child pohcy while allowing the state to offer further justification for it. 
It ignored the widespread patterns in fertility dechne seen elsewhere in the 
world, particularly the impact of development on childbearing preferences in 
the absence of heavy-handed state intervention. Nor did the calculation offer 
any way to compare the impact on population size of the one-child policy, as 
opposed to a universal two-child policy that focused on the spacing of chil­
dren, or an approach premised entirely on guaranteed and substantial rewards 
for comphance, or even one that maintained the de facto late-marriage pol­
icy that had been in place during the Cultural Revolution. ^"*
If it is difficult to calculate the number of births that were prevented exclu­
sively by the one-child policy, it is easy to observe other effects of the policy. 
First, it meant that an entire generation of childbearing-age couples was sub­
jected to state control over the number of children they were permitted to 
have, and when they were permitted to have them. It is important to separate 
these two impacts to understand their fuU implications. The one-child birth
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limit meant that childbearing-age couples were not permitted to have more 
than one child (or two for couples who met specific conditions), and women 
were subjected to constant monitoring by the state and its local agents to 
ensure that couples who were compHant at the age of twenty remained com- 
pUant at the age of thirty. Less well understood, however, is that in the early 
years of the campaign, many women who became pregnant with their first 
child, but without official permission, were required to have an abortion. 
And in more recent years, as the numbers permitted to have a second child 
grew, failure to comply with regulations requiring couples to wait three or 
four years to have a second child could also result in pressure to abort.
Women were also the subjects on which most medical procedures were 
carried out. Their bodies bore the physical weight of enforcement, and the 
state used the birth of a first child or the abortion of a subsequent pregnancy 
as an opportunity to insert an lUD or carry out a tubal ligation. This was 
particularly true in the countryside, where resistance to the one-child Hmit 
was widespread and campaign-style roundups of pregnant women were fre­
quent events. Despite recognition in the 1980s that vasectomy was a cheaper 
and safer medical alternative to tubal ligation, only a very small proportion 
of men underwent the procedure, and no major educational campaigns were 
carried out to encourage male sterilization. When asked about this issue in 
the early 1990s, both male and female officials in the countryside felt that 
attempts to increase the rate of male sterilization were futile. They claimed 
that women preferred to take the risk of undergoing steriUzation, fearing 
that male sterilization would reduce permanently the strength and viriUty 
of their husbands. When asked why those attitudes could not be changed 
with the same investment of state resources that had been devoted to imple­
menting the one-child policy, it was clear they had never considered that 
possibiUty.^^
While men were exhorted to support the one-child pohcy, the female 
reproductive system, one of the few areas that had not been completely sub­
sumed by the radical pohtics of the Mao era, was explicitly redefined as a pub­
lic domain. In addition to the poHcies and regulations passed at each level of 
government that brought reproduction under state authority, an even more 
visible symbol of state intrusion was the widespread practice in rural China 
of publicly documenting the menstrual cycle and birth control method of 
each childbearing-age woman in the village. PubUc exposure contributed to 
other pressures to conform and underscored the power of local authorities to 
engineer family size, composition, and change.
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In addition to its direct impact on reproductive age women, the one-child 
policy influenced the Chinese family and society in a variety of ways. The 
most direct impact on Chinese society was to create a two-track society and 
a two-track generation: children who were born in urban areas were over­
whelmingly likely to be single children (singletons), and children who had 
one or more siblings were most likely rural-born. By 2010, about 63 percent 
of all Chinese families had a single child, but in cities the percentage was 
much higher. Children were reared, then, in an atmosphere where they were 
uniformly surrounded by other singletons, a revolutionary change from the 
recent past, and one that raised deep concerns in China about the tempera­
ment, values, and psychological well-being of this generation. Development 
and commercialization meant that these singletons experienced a degree of 
wealth and disposable income that was inconceivable to their parents and 
grandparents when they were young. Indulged by grandparents and parents, 
they became important consumers in the new economy, altering the bal­
ance of power within the family.^*
With no competition from other sibhngs, singletons were the sole ben­
eficiary of their parents’ resources and attention. This contributed to par­
ents’ abihty to invest in their child’s education and devote themselves to 
their socioeconomic advancement, an important dividend of the one-child 
pohcy.''^ It also increased pressure on the child to succeed in school, career, 
and marriage, sometimes to the detriment of their psychological health. 
Meanwhile, the decline and collapse of the aversion to divorce that had been 
characteristic of the Maoist era, combined with a simphfied process for legal 
divorce, meant that growing numbers of singletons were the children of 
divorce, hving with a single parent or vdth a parent and stepparent.’® These 
changes, of course, are consistent with social changes that have occurred in 
other developing societies, and are not the direct byproduct of the one-child 
pohcy. The role of the one-child poHcy was to remove the cushion from 
these events sometimes provided by siblings, who can support one another as 
they move through wrenching family changes.
Another important consequence of the one-child poUcy was to create a 
family structure composed of an inverted triangle: four grandparents, two 
parents, and one child (the so-called 4-2-1 phenomenon). Given the tra­
ditional Chinese emphasis on care for the elderly, the weight of obligation 
to be carried by singletons was a source of concern, both on the micro and 
macro levels. At each level, the issue was the same. In micro form, the ques­
tion was how a singleton could pay for the care and well-being of seven
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family members, or two married singletons care for fifteen people, includ­
ing their single child. In macro form, the question translated into the prob­
lem every society faces with population ageing: how can the working adults 
in a society care for very large numbers of elderly and youth, and simulta­
neously maintain the levels of economic productivity necessary to sustain 
economic growth?
As China moved through an exceptionally rapid fertihty decline in the last 
decades of the twentieth century, it did so having already achieved an increase 
in hfe span and a decUne in mortahty that was exceptional in the developing 
world. As a result, its younger generation is smaller than the one that came 
before it, and its older generation wiU have an average hfe span consistent 
with that of advanced industriaUzed countries. This dependency ratio (most 
commonly defined as the total number of elderly and youth as a percentage 
of the number of working-age adults) has worsened in many countries in the 
industrialized world that have very low fertihty (e.g., Italy and Japan). China 
is unique, however, in the degree to which the dependency factor has grown 
prior to reaching income levels equivalent to those of advanced industri- 
ahzed countries. In 2012, China experienced its first ever natural absolute 
decrease in its labor force, with 3.45 milhon fewer workers than the previous 
year and a projected dechne of about 29 milhon by the end of the decade. Put 
more starkly, in 2009 there were thirteen working-age adults for each elderly 
person; by 2050, there will be only two. Persons aged sixty or older comprised 
8.8 percent of China’s population in 1990, reached 10 percent by the end of 
the century, and was at 13.7 percent in 2013.Though this figure did not yet 
place China among those countries with the highest percentages of elderly 
population, the raw numbers show the scope of what China faces. By the 
year 2013, the elderly population numbered approximately 185 miUion, on its 
way up to an estimated 284 million by 2025, and 440 niilHon by 2050.^® This 
trend will place tremendous pressure on the working adult population, as their 
labor will be expected to generate much of the national wealth needed to care 
for their elders and their children.
Another way in which the one-child poHcy has impacted society is 
through its contribution to migration and to the creation of a class of chil­
dren collectively known as heiren, that is,“black” or illegal persons.This term, 
which emerged in the 1980s, is used to describe individuals born without 
state permission, and who therefore do not officially exist. As children, heiren 
are denied access to any services or benefits that come from being regis­
tered officially as part of a household or locale, including access to healthcare
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and schooling. Faced with pressures to abort or pay exorbitant fines for 
“unplanned” or illegal births, some parents choose to run, becoming part 
of the enormous migrant population that has spread over China during the 
reform era. This buys them time to give birth to the child, but it does not 
solve the problem of registration. Recent efforts to reform the household 
registration {hukou) system, and to permit migrants to register for school in 
the location where the family lives, may slowly improve the situation, but in 
the short run, those unable to pay the fines for giving birth outside the plan 
win continue to be caught in bureaucratic hmbo.*°
One of the most disturbing effects of the one-child pohcy is its contribu­
tion to a marked sex ratio imbalance in those born after 1979. Over time 
and across many different human populations, sex ratios at birth—that is, the 
number of males born during a given time period compared to the number 
of females—hover around 105 boys for every 100 girls. On occasion, for a 
hmited period of time, this ratio may vary naturally, with a few more or a 
few less boys for each 100 girls. Data from China’s 2000 census, however, 
revealed that the sex ratio at birth was approximately 119 boys for every 100 
girls, and the 2010 census gave similar results. If that were not serious enough, 
the national figures mask much more severe distortions, with some provinces 
and regions recording sex ratios of 125 or more males for each 100 females.®' 
From the beginning of the one-cluld policy, there was concern that the 
traditional preference for sons that was deeply embedded in Chinese cul­
ture might result in an imbalanced sex ratio at birth. In the September 
1980 “Open Letter” on the one-child policy, for example, several of the 
most common objections to the policy were aired, including fears that it 
would lead to female infanticide and abandonment and, consequently, to 
an imbalance in the sex ratio.These fears were initially discounted, but they 
proved to be warranted. In the early 1980s senior officials became alarmed 
about the many reports of female infanticide and female abandonment on 
the part of couples desperate to have a son. The infanticide reports pro­
duced a firestorm of controversy at home and abroad, leading the regime to 
respond in two contradictory ways. First, it denied that there was a wide­
spread problem; census and survey data were used to show that China’s sex 
ratio at birth was well within what was considered to be the normal range 
and in keeping with China’s own population history. Though conceding 
that incidents of infanticide and abandonment did occur, it was insisted 
that such cases were rare, and that they occurred only in the most back­
ward regions of the countryside, where the “feudal mentality” remained
358 REPRODUCTIVE STATES
entrenched. The solution proposed was an education campaign to uproot 
such backward ideas, but education alone was of little use, given the social 
and economic reaUties that privileged male offspring.
By 1984, as reports of female infanticide multipUed and the All-China 
Women’s Federation (ACWF) began to insist that the problem be faced 
and addressed, the state changed tack. Rather than address the underlying 
causes of gender bias, however, it made concessions to rural sensibiHties and 
adjusted the one-child policy to allow single-daughter households to try 
again—for a son. In the countryside, the state conceded, women were con­
sidered socially inferior and worth less economically. Sonless couples were 
disadvantaged economically and socially, the potential prey of stronger fam­
ilies and kin groups. Single-daughter households should therefore be given 
special consideration, just as minority groups and the parents of invaHds 
were given special consideration. Although the intent of the 1984 poHcy 
change was to legitimize what was already happening in the countryside, it 
had the effect of reinforcing existing prejudices against females. A woman 
with a single daughter and no sons might be applauded by local officials, 
but in the real world of the village she was likely subject to a Hfetime of 
pity, social ridicule, and blame, much of it heaped upon her by other rural 
women who had themselves endured such pressures.
Faced with intense demands from the state, on the one hand, and their peers 
and elders, on the other, some took the desperate course of female infanti­
cide to preserve the chance to have a son. As the 1980s progressed, however, 
two alternative strategies emerged.The first was infant abandonment, which 
increased substantially in the late 1980s and 1990s in response to a tightening 
of the birth control poHcies. Although some infants were placed with rela­
tives or rural famihes without children, in keeping with long-standing cus­
tom in China during times of poHtical upheaval and economic crisis, many 
were left to be discovered by strangers who turned them over to pubHc secu­
rity officials. From there, they were sent to local orphanages, where new pro­
cedures were slowly developed to create avenues for adoption. Fearful that 
domestic adoption by young couples would undermine the one-child policy, 
however, the adoption law passed in 1991 only allowed couples over the age 
of thirty-five and childless to adopt a child.This restriction, in turn, led to an 
upturn in international adoption, as couples and singles from the prosperous 
regions of North America, Europe, and Asia arranged for adoptions.*^
The second strategy for guaranteeing a son was the use of ultrasound 
technology and sex-selective abortion. By the early 1990s, most state-run
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hospitals and clinics had acquired ultrasound equipment capable of fetal 
sex determination. And as private chnics prohferated in the 1990s, they too 
were equipped with ultrasound technology, providing easy access for a fee. 
Despite repeated condemnations of sex-selective abortion and attempts to 
outlaw the use of ultrasound technology for fetal sex identification, easy 
access to the technology, combined with the lure of lucrative bribes and 
consultation fees, made ultrasound use very popular. Contrary to official 
statements blaming rural backwardness for the problem, it quickly became 
clear that the sex ratio distortions were widespread. In 1981, the Chinese sex 
ratio at birth, 108.5 males for every 100 females, had already been sHghtly 
in excess of the norm. Over the next twenty years, the sex ratio in favor of 
males at birth rose dramatically, to approximately in in 1985, 116 in 1992, 
and 119 by 2000. A decade later, the 2010 census showed sex ratios at birth 
were still hovering around 119 males per 100 females.
In the early 1990s, Chinese experts attributed most of the skew in the sex 
ratio to underreporting of female births, particularly illegal births, imply­
ing that the actual sex ratio at birth remained within, or close to, acceptable 
norms. Provoked by Amartya Sen’s provocative 1990 essay on the “100 mil­
lion women” missing in India and China, however, scholarly research and 
writing on the issue increased dramatically, as did research on the situation 
in China.'*'^ By the late 1990s, candid assessments by Chinese scholars con­
cluded that sex-selective abortion was widespread and was the main cause 
of the distorted sex ratio. Moreover, accumulating data indicated that the 
phenomenon was not just a rural problem, nor was it concentrated in the 
least-educated segment of the population. Instead, the combined effect of 
the one-child birth hmit, traditional son preference, and easy access to a tech­
nology that allowed couples to make sure they had a son was to tempt peo­
ple from a wide variety of socioeconomic backgrounds to choose sons over 
daughters. Just as the state had justified its attempts to engineer national pop­
ulation growth, couples justified the use of sex-selective abortion to engineer 
the sex of their only child.
The resulting skew in the sex ratio has raised alarms over the “army of 
bachelors,” or as they are referred to in Chinese, “bare branches” (guang 
gun-er), who are now, or will be in the future, unable to find wives as adults. 
Although this problem has already begun to appear among those born 
after 1980, it will get much worse before it gets better. Census data for 2000 
revealed about 8.5 milHon missing girls, but by 2010 the number had risen 
to more than 20 milHon.'^^ In 2012, there were an estimated 18 million more
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boys than girls under the age of 15, and by 2020, estimates suggest there may 
be anywhere from 30 to 40 million males in marriage-age cohorts who will 
be unable to find wives. Even if the sex ratio imbalance returns to balance by 
2020, that number will grow, and the impact of these deficits will be felt late 
into the twenty-first century.*^®
This deficit of females has already begun to have an impact on marriage 
markets in China. Rural men of marriage age compete for a hmited number 
of wives from the local area, and as the number of “leftover” men continues 
to grow, the higher the costs of marriage become. Men whose famihes are 
unable to raise enough money are unable to marry, and frequendy resort to 
marriage brokers to help them find brides from other provinces.®’ Despite 
these and other efforts, however, the number of unmarried men in their late 
twenties is rising rapidly. While the shortage of women has allowed some 
brides to marry into a higher economic or social status, others have become 
more vulnerable to human trafficking, or to abuse in their new homes, where 
they are far removed from their family support system. Conversely, disadvan­
taged men are vulnerable to being cheated by marriage brokers, or by the 
bride and her family. There have been many reports of brides disappearing 
days after their marriage, once the bride’s family had received the compensa­
tion they had demanded for their daughter.®*
Conclusion
In his astute essay on the coUapse of the Soviet regimes in eastern Europe 
in 1989, Daniel Chirot pointed to the great irony of attempting to build the 
sociaHsm of the future on forms of industrial organization that were rapidly 
growing obsolete. Massive concentrations of industrial plants and workers 
was a late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century approach that helped 
Russia overcome its slow start on the road to industrialization, but it was an 
inadequate response to the mid-twentieth-century conditions that increas­
ingly privileged innovation, speed, adaptability, and global reach. Post-World 
War II socialist economies, therefore, were built on structures that were rap­
idly becoming an anachronism.®®
The same irony pervades the history of China’s population poHcy, espe­
cially the one-child policy. By the time China embraced the one-child poHcy, 
nearly everything that inspired it was on the cusp of becoming obsolete.The 
intellectual hubris of the population control movement that peaked between
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the mid-1960s and 1980 would shortly thereafter begin to flounder under 
the combined challenges of the Green Revolution, revisionist demographic 
theories that challenged the orthodox view that population growth impeded 
development, and feminist and conservative challenges. Indeed, in retrospect 
one might argue that the 1984 UN conference on population held in Mexico 
City marked the beginning of the end for orthodox demographic theories 
that assumed population control was essential for successful economic devel­
opment. At that conference, the Reagan administration sent a conservative 
delegation to challenge family planning on revisionist and moral grounds, 
while developing countries like Mexico, who were stiU deeply suspicious 
of neo-Malthusian arguments in 1974, embraced the orthodox view on the 
necessity of population control, and NGOs representing feminist views 
embraced a reproductive rights approach that would win the day in Cairo a 
decade later.’®
In the midst of this ferment, China moved to embrace precisely the 
“numbers is everything” approach that was the core beHef of the population 
controllers, wrapping it in a language of sociahst modernization that was 
uniquely Chinese. Once in place, and with the full weight of the new reform 
leaders behind it, the legitimacy of the project and the validity of the method 
were difficult to challenge. The party had declared that the achievement of 
“modernization by the year 2000” depended on the successful implemen­
tation of the one-child birth Hmit. Even when it became clear that China 
would exceed aU expectations for economic growth by the year 2000, even 
when it became clear that the social consequences of the policy were severe, 
even when “population control” had become a discredited approach to 
demographic challenges, the poHcy remained in place. It recedes now as an 
anachronism, but its social and poUtical consequences will be felt for decades 
to come.
Beyond the consequences discussed above, there is the rage left behind 
in many Chinese over the state’s unwillingness to adopt a two-child policy 
many years earlier, and its reHance on an enforcement system that privileges 
the rich, allowing them to effectively purchase a second child by paying 
a large “social compensation fee,” while avoiding the pressure, harassment, 
or outright coercion experienced by ordinary Chinese whose pregnancy 
is deemed illegal. As Chinese writer Ma Jian noted in a 2013 op-ed in the 
NewYork Times, however, venting popular anger against wealthy and famous 
individuals hke film director ZhangYimou (accused of fathering seven chil­
dren with four different women) “plays into the party’s hands” by deflecting
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public outrage away from “the government’s barbaric policy.’’^’ However 
one judges the one-child policy—as an economic and social necessity, a 
barbaric violation of human rights and dignity, or a dual-edged sword—it 
is important to keep in mind that although the one-child birth limit will 
disappear, the state has not conceded its authority to plan China’s popula­
tion growth.The birth limit is changing, but the logic that led to a one-child 
policy remains in place. Changing demographics, rising popular protest, and 
global influences have certainly moderated China’s approach to implemen­
tation of birth hmits, as well as the language used to describe the program, 
but the Chinese approach to population policy remains grounded in the 
principle of state sovereignty over reproduction.This enduring claim, and its 
policy consequences, will continue to set the Chinese case apart for many 
years to come.
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